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Abstract: With this article we contribute to debates on urban land governance and sustainable urban
development in Africa by providing an empirical analysis of forced displacement and resettlement
associated with infrastructure development in Beira city, Mozambique. In recent years Beira has
become the recipient of numerous investment flows targeting the built environment by a range of
international investors. By analyzing the micropolitical engagements associated with three different
infrastructure projects, based on extensive qualitative interviews, observations, and document
analysis, we demonstrate how each intervention has been associated with highly informal and
divergent processes of forced displacement and resettlement. We argue that these land related
impacts have been annexed from debates on sustainable infrastructure development, and that they
exhibit some fundamental differences from established resettlement research. We conclude by arguing
that forced displacement and resettlement should be understood as a deliberate and systematic feature
of urban infrastructure development, through which new social-spatial arrangements are created.
This ultimately points to the emergence of a novel mode of fragmented urbanism within the context
of urban development in Africa which poses new challenges to urban sustainability.
Keywords: infrastructure development; resettlement; African urbanism; sustainable urbanization;
urban land governance; forced displacement
1. Introduction
The port city of Beira, Mozambique’s second largest, has recently become the recipient of hundreds
of millions of dollars in investments from various international donors, targeting the expansion of
the city’s infrastructure. For a city long characterized by unplanned urbanization, dilapidation,
and extreme vulnerability to flooding, these new investment flows represent an unprecedented
modernization effort under the current municipal government. It is due to their ability to attract high
profile infrastructure investments that Beira’s leadership has received substantial praise from a range
of international donors, branding the municipality as a poster child for effective urban governance
in Africa.
Ranging from public green space to economic infrastructure, these investments serve a variety
of societal purposes and interests, thus defying sweeping categorizations. Despite their differences
however, many investments have shared the common feature of disrupting established land uses,
resulting in forced displacement and resettlement. In contrast to the high profile interventions which
instigated their creation however, these dynamics have occurred largely outside the public eye, annexed
from the city’s development narrative. It is here, in the shadows of the primary intervention, that we
see investment flows leading to the creation of new urban spaces to house the displaced.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3123; doi:10.3390/su10093123 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3123 2 of 18
In recent years infrastructure development has emerged as a priority concern within the context
of African urban development, advocated for by leading development institutions and critical
scholars alike [1–3]. As a result, historically neglected cities, such as Beira, are now becoming the
benefactors of international investment flows targeting the built environment [4,5]. As seen in Beira
however, urban infrastructure development often comes hand in hand with forced displacement,
as infrastructure development is inherently premised on the availability of land, which in the context
of African urbanism is always someone’s land. So far however, debates on African infrastructure
development have not addressed these land-related impacts, focusing instead on the societal value
of new infrastructures. It is against this background that a new ‘urban land debate’ has emerged,
with scholars arguing that land governance must be factored into debates on sustainable urban
development [4,5].
How forced displacement and resettlement play out in the urban context, and how they relate to
issues of urban sustainability, is currently poorly understood however. It is against this background that
this article aims to contribute to debates on urban land governance and sustainable urban development
in Africa, through empirical and conceptual exploration of forced displacement and resettlement in
Beira city. Our objectives here are twofold; (1) to provide an empirical investigation of the displacement
and resettlement processes associated with three distinct infrastructure interventions in Beira and
(2) to provide conceptual reflections on how these dynamic should be understood within frameworks
of sustainable urban development.
We do so by analyzing the displacement ‘micropolitics’ [6,7] underlying three recent high profile
infrastructure interventions in Beira, each associated with a different international financer. With this
analysis we reveal that each intervention has been associated with distinct micropolitical constellations,
resulting in three highly divergent and informal resettlement processes. We argue that the urban
context, as seen in Beira, provides distinct institutional and political challenges not yet observed in
established resettlement literature, which has focused predominantly on rural realm interventions.
From a conceptual perspective we argue that displacement and resettlement should be understood not
just as a destructive process, but as a creative one as well, whereby ‘primary’ infrastructure investments
instigate the creation of ‘secondary’ resettlement spaces. We argue that this ‘creative’ process is both a
deliberate and systematic feature of urban infrastructure development, and that it should be brought
to the foreground in frameworks of sustainable urban development.
We begin our discussion with contemporary debates on African infrastructure development and
the urban land question, focusing particularly on the issue of ‘Development Induced Displacement’
(DID) and resettlement. Following this we provide a discussion of urban development and land
governance in Beira. After this we delve in-depth into empirical findings of three recent cases
of infrastructure development, encompassing the development of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ),
urban river rehabilitation, and storm water drainage, each associated with different donors and
resulting in divergent displacement and resettlement dynamics. By distinguishing three consecutive
analytical moments of flow mobilization, space clearing, and new urban spaces, we trace the
mobilization, negotiation, and congealing of these flows into new urban spaces. We conclude by
offering some reflections on the topic of urban sustainability, arguing that DID and resettlement should
be at to the forefront of contemporary debates on infrastructure development in Africa.
2. Urban Development and the Urban Land Question in Africa
2.1. The Infrastructural Turn in African Urban Development
In recent years infrastructure development has emerged as a priority concern within the context
of African urban development among international donors and progressive urban scholars alike [1,2].
It is through this infrastructural turn in African urban development debates, that social, economic,
and environmental targets are increasingly understood as a function of the ‘right’ infrastructures. It is
against this background that a range of new (international) modalities and institutional arrangements
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are being established with the aim of mobilizing investments into Africa’s cities. Although the
implications of these new flows have not yet been analyzed in detail, they are expected to drastically
change the nature of African cities [4,5].
Whereas there is a notable consensus for the need for greater investments in Africa’s urban
infrastructure, this is most certainly not the case with regards to the priorities and interests of the
infrastructural agenda itself. As illustrated by the flurry of urban visions promising ‘entrepreneurial’,
‘smart’, and ‘ecological’ urban futures (to name a few), what exactly constitutes the ‘right’ infrastructure
has become the topic of considerable contention [3,8–10]. Critical scholars have pointed to the fact
that many of these visions essentially constitute variations of the same top-down market-oriented
and techno-rationalist logic, which are ill-suited to realizing progressive urban change [9,11]. It is
against this background that leading African urbanists have sought a closer engagement with the
realms of policy and politics, so as to contribute to the formulation of emancipatory urban change [12].
Advocating for such an approach in a recent GIZ report, Pieterse et al. [3] have called for a new agenda
of sustainable urbanization, hinged on the notion of sustainable infrastructure which, among other
things, ‘depends on the activation of citizens and rights’ (p. 15).
What appears to be a general trait of these various frameworks of urban (infrastructure)
development however is their tendency to presuppose the availability of land upon which new
infrastructures are to be developed. As we know however, urban land in Africa is always someone’s
land. Intervening in the built environment thus logically implies some displacement of existing land
claims [4,5,9]. While such impacts are perhaps of little concern to overtly speculative and exclusionary
urban frameworks [8,9], they go straight to the heart of progressive frameworks [3], as displacement
disproportionately impacts the rights of the urban poor. Although proponents of sustainable
infrastructure have also argued for the importance of urban land rights, while simultaneously
recognizing the inequity of many urban land use systems in Africa, these concerns have yet to
be related explicitly to infrastructure development [2,13]. Thus, by debating urban infrastructure in
terms of its societal function only, as if it already exists, an important component of its societal impact
remains largely obscured.
2.2. Displacement, Resettlement and the Urban Land Question
It is this earlier moment, where established land claims are displaced by new claims, which has
recently sparked the ‘urban land debate’ [4,5]. Taking cues from debates on rural land grabbing and
displacement, scholars have argued that a surge in land-based investments will have far reaching
implications for established land claims and livelihoods in targeted cities. Currently however, the land
related impacts of urban infrastructure development are both poorly understood and therefore highly
uncertain. This issue appears to be similarly overlooked in current policy debates on urban land
governance, which have revolved around issues of tenure security and regularization [4]. In countries
such as Mozambique however, tenure is fundamentally insecure in the face of urban development
undertaken in reference to the public interest, as infrastructure often is, irrespective of the tenure
regime in question.
The reality of infrastructure development is that it has historically come hand in hand with
so-called ‘development induced displacement’ (DID), for which resettlement has been the common
mitigation measure [14]. Both DID and resettlement have long been among the most contentious
topics within development debates, as those relinquishing their home and land for ‘development’
have routinely been left worse off [15–17]. Despite essentially constituting two sides of the same coin,
resettlement is often conceived as a separate policy issue, annexing the experiences of affected people
from the development narrative legitimizing their resettlement in the first place. So far however,
in-depth resettlement research has focused predominantly on large-scale and one-off interventions in
the rural realm [6,7,17–19]. What DID and resettlement ultimately mean within the context of urban
development, and how it relates to issues of urban sustainability, is therefore largely unknown.
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This is not to say that resettlement, or forced displacement more generally, has not appeared in
contemporary urban research in Africa, quite the opposite [20–22]. By focusing on issues of urban
political-economy and governance, where resettlement and displacement appear as symptoms of
the broader urban dynamics under scrutiny, these contributions provide little understanding of the
inner ‘micropolitics’ where DID and resettlement is negotiated and contested [6,7]. Perhaps more
importantly, these contributions have focused on instances of neo-liberal urbanization and its many
guises, no doubt due to the contested nature of this framework in urban theory. The net result has been
that displacement and resettlement have been discussed as functions of exploitative market-based
urban development only, where moral outcry is often both justified and uncomplicated. How we are
to relate DID and resettlement to urban development which falls outside the rubrics of neoliberal
urbanism remains unclear however.
2.3. A Framework for Urban DID and Resettlement
Taking the urban land debate as a general orientation we propose a framework of DID and
resettlement which take the land and its claimants as the primary unit of analysis in a dispassionate
and comparative manner. This implies bringing the actors and negotiations of DID and resettlement
to the foreground, in a manner sensitive to temporal and political contingency. In doing so we build
on recent work by Milgroom [6] and Otsuki et al. [7] which has elucidated the project micropolitics
shaping DID and resettlement processes.
We use three distinct analytical moments to structure the analysis of the cases discussed here.
Flow mobilization refers to the incentives and interests driving the ‘primary’ infrastructure investment.
By identifying the specific actors involved we seek to demystify the political components which
make up these development ‘flows’. Clearing space is the second moment which we use to analyze
the political engagements associated with clearing land for development through the resettlement
of former land users. Finally we use New spaces as a means to pull infrastructure development
and resettlement into a closer conceptual orbit, by discussing both as new spaces created through
these investment flows. By doing so we seek to go past a discussion of livelihood impacts alone,
by understanding resettlement as a ‘creative’ process. By discussing the social-spatial characteristics of
these new spaces, focusing particularly on the resettlements, we are then able to debate how these
spaces relate to issues of urban sustainability.
3. Research Context
3.1. Contemporary Urban Development in Beira
Beira city is located in the central Sofala province, it a strategically important port city and
Mozambique’ second largest with around 500,000 residents. Due to coastal erosion and an extreme
vulnerability to urban flooding, it is often described as one of Africa’s most climate vulnerable cities.
Perhaps most importantly, Beira is historically an opposition stronghold. Long considered a bastion of
the RENAMO party—the leading rival of the FRELIMO party which has won all consecutive national
elections—Beira’s municipality is now ruled by a relatively new opposition party called MDM [23].
Beira’s opposition status is widely considered to have resulted in the city’s (strategic) neglect at the
hands of the central FRELIMO government. The historically contentious relationship between the
municipality and central state is broadly recognized as a pervasive feature of Beira’s urban governance
and civic identity [24,25]
In recent years Beira has become the subject of growing interests from international donors
however. For, it has emerged as a vital logistical node in Mozambique’s coal boom and the Beira
Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC), a large-scale agricultural modernization initiative [26,27].
Moreover, due to its problematic relationship with the central state, MDM has become particularly
adept at minimizing its dependence on the central government by attracting resources from abroad.
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As a result, the city has recently become the recipient of a disproportionate amount of donor
investments in the realm of infrastructure, and more generally, the built environment.
These recent and ongoing commitments to Beira city include various water, drainage,
and sanitation infrastructure projects by the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA),
the World Bank, the European Union, and Netherlands. River rehabilitation and green space
development has been undertaken by the KFW development bank and the World Bank. Several
urban planning initiatives have been undertaken with the support of GIZ, the Netherlands, and the
World Bank. Coastal protection has occurred with funding from Switzerland. Transport infrastructure
has been conducted by China and the Netherlands. Real estate development has been conducted by the
Netherlands. Special Economic Zone development has been completed by China. Port dredging has
occurred with funding from the Netherlands and port master planning funded by DFID. Taken together
these investments represent an unprecedented modernization effort in Beira city. As demonstrated by
Shankland & Cambote however, these investments inevitably flow through the central state, and are
therefore often associated with contentious negotiations and political fractionism [25].
3.2. Urban Land Governance in Beira
Such a range of interventions in the built environment will inevitably have far reaching
implications for established land claims; therefore it is worth briefly discussing the institutional
arrangements underlying current land claims in Beira. Urban land governance in Mozambique has
historically evolved amidst the contradictions and gaps of successive state regimes [28–31]. This has
given rise to a set of institutional practices which bear little relationship to formal bureaucratic laws and
regulations [32–34]. This is not a simple story of formality vs. informality however, as these practices
are underpinned and regulated by lower levels of the formal municipality bureaucracy. In addition to
constituting a relatively stable set of institutional practices, this mode of urban land governance enjoys
considerable social legitimacy, arguably more so than ‘formal’ urban land governance arrangements
which often exist only on paper. As a result scholars have described urban land governance in
Mozambique as being structured by ‘alternative formality’ and ‘twilight’ institutions [32] (p. 424) [33],
as they fall outside the (normative) categorizations of formality and informality.
From the perspective of formal land governance, Mozambique is often celebrated for having a
progressive land rights framework. The Mozambican land law provides legal recognition of customary
and usufruct land tenure, the former being based on 10 years uncontested occupancy, on equal legal
footing to land titles allocated by the state. These titles, known as DUATs, are based on a long term
use right, as the ownership of land and thus its sale is prohibited by the Mozambican constitution.
In the urban context however, considerable ambiguity exists in relation to the land law, as urban
land regulations have left out and watered down some of these progressive measures applicable
to the ‘rural’ context only [30,31]. For one, no mention is made of customary land rights in urban
regulations. Secondly, usufruct land rights in the urban context can only be formalized in areas where
urban planning has been undertaken. A lack of bureaucratic capacity and political will to implement
these regulations has meant that urban residents are often not eligible for the formalization of their
usufruct rights.
Whereas the sale of land is prohibited according to the logic of formal land governance, it is
a central feature of ‘alternative formality’ where the land market constitutes the primary means of
access to land alongside inherence [32]. The logic of ‘alternative formality’ is premised on the sale of
land, often agricultural land or a portion of an existing plot, between a willing buyer and a willing
seller, upon which a new a house is then built. These transactions are overseen by local chiefs and
the neighborhood secretary, known as the chefe de Bairro, which constitutes the lowest level of the
formal municipality administration [33]. Once the new land owner takes up residence they can file for
a declaration of occupancy or declaração, which is an affidavit provided by the neighborhood secretary
which is required to open bank accounts and engage in formal employment (among other things).
The process of overseeing land transactions and providing such affidavits is regularly associated with
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the payment fees to local leaders and the neighborhood secretary, which creates a financial incentive
among benefactors for continued (illegal) land transactions. It is nonetheless a system which has been
credited with providing a high degree of tenure security [31,33,34]
From the perspective of ‘formality’ the land claims established through ‘alternative formality’
are based on illegal transactions which are, at best, eligible for usufruct rights after 10 years if in
compliance with urban plans developed by the municipality. In the face of urban ‘development’
however, all tenure is fundamentally insecure as the state is vested with the ability to expropriate
land if deemed to be in the public interest. In such instances a broader framework of environmental
planning and resettlement/expropriation laws apply, with the latter laws requiring either material
resettlements or financial compensation based on the type of intervention. This requires, among other
things, involvement of provincial (central) government departments in DID inducing interventions.
How these provisions relate the claims of ‘alternative formality’ are entirely unclear however.
4. Materials and Methods
The research findings were collected within the context of an ongoing PhD research on
international development cooperation, urban development, and land governance in Beira, for which
data collection was undertaken in Mozambique (Maputo and Beira) and the Netherlands between
May 2015 and May 2018. Research in Mozambique was undertaken with support of Centro Terra
Viva, a Maputo based land rights organization, and the Catholic University of Mozambique in Beira.
The findings discussed in this article were based predominantly on data collection undertaken during
three separate periods in Beira, consisting of three months between September and November 2015,
a similar period in 2016, and one month in between May and June in 2017.
Qualitative interviews constituted the primary date collection method. Eighty in-depth
semi-structured interviews were undertaken with representatives of resettled households, including
local leaders, who were recruited through door-to-door visits in resettlement locations. Twenty-eight
in-depth interviews were undertaken with representatives of key institutional counterparts associated
with the resettlements. With regards to the agricultural displacement associated with the drainage
rehabilitation project, 22 concise semi-structured interviews were undertaken with household members
and local leaders recruited through snowballing in the neighborhoods surrounding the intervention
site. As interviews with household respondents of the drainage rehabilitation case were undertaken
within two months of the resettlement, an additional 13 concise semi-structured interviews were
undertaken six months later to follow-up on their resettlement experience.
In-depth semi-structured interviews with household respondents and institutional counterparts
generally took 30–75 min and were organized around predetermined topics. The interviews were
undertaken in Portuguese, English, and on occasion, in the local dialects Sena and Ndau. The majority
of interviews were undertaken in the accompaniment of one or two local research assistants who
provided support with translation (where necessary) and knowledge of community customs and
institutions. In accordance with local practice, formal permission was granted by the municipality in
written form for undertaking the research in the resettlement communities. Due to sensitivity of the
subject matter it was decided against recording interviews in favor of extensive note-taking during
interviews which were transcribed electronically later on the same day.
Data collection and analysis was broadly based on grounded approach, whereby the preliminary
analysis of data served to further refine the selection of respondents and interview topics in an iterative
manner. The final analysis of the transcripts was undertaken using deductive and inductive coding
consisting of categories relating to the resettlement process, power relations, institutional legitimacy,
and social-spatial outcomes. This data was complemented by extensive field notes, observation, and
(project) document and policy analysis.
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5. Results
The three interventions discussed in the following section are depicted in Figure 1, showing the
respective intervention sites, displacement trajectories and resettlement locations.
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5.1. The Manga Mungassa Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
5.1.1. Mobilizing Investments for the SEZ
In 2009 the Mozambican government established GAZEDA, a governmental body tasked with
the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). The SEZ concept is modeled on the Chinese export
zones and was adopted through close Sino-Mozambican ties. Beira was identified as the second
location for an SEZ which was approved by GAZEDA in 2012. Known as the Manga-Mungassa
Special Economic Zone, Beira’s SEZ was aimed at becoming a logistics and manufacturing hub
within the broader Beira corridor. The SEZ was allocated an area of 217 hectares, with a total of
1000 hectares being earmarked for future expansion. Development and management of the SEZ
was awarded to the Chinese SOGECOA company, a subsidiary of the Anhui Foreign Economic
Construction Group (AFECC), with total commitments reportedly totaling 500 million US dollars.
After its initial designation by GAZEDA, the development of the SEZ was handled primarily by
SOGECOA in cooperation with the municipality of Beira.
5.1.2. Clearing Space for the SEZ
The Manga-Mungassa SEZ was allocated land in the neighborhood of Mungassa, an area which
has been earmarked for commercial expansion by the municipality. Due to its locations along the
N6 national highway, Mungassa is well located for logistical enterprises in particular. Currently
however, Mungassa is a residential neighborhood set in lush greenery comprising mixed residential
and agricultural land use. For residents of Mungassa the N6 plays a crucial role in urban mobility as it
constitutes a main artery of Beira’s bustling chapa minibus system.
The households living within the allocated area varied in terms of household income, housing
conditions, and livelihoods, a demographic diversity not uncommon to Beira’s neighborhoods.
The SEZ development would ultimately lead to the forced displacement and/or resettlements of
circa 110 households and an undetermined amount of small-scale farmers. The households comprised
long- and short-term residents, ranging from those which had lived in the area for generations to
households which had moved there shortly before the SEZ project became known. The vast majority
had bought land in the neighborhood and had constructed their properties incrementally with hired
labor. Only two of the households had formal property titles, which they had acquired through the
(former) nationalized housing scheme dating from Mozambique’s socialist era [29]. The majority had
declarations of occupancy from the neighborhood secretary in accordance with established urban
governance practices in Mozambique [32–34].
The SEZ constituted the first large-scale resettlement undertaken by the municipality and was
associated with widespread conflict between the community and municipality. According to key
respondents no formal impact assessments or resettlement planning was undertaken prior to the
resettlement as required by Mozambican law. Due to the varied means and response within the
community three distinct resettlement groups would ultimately emerge from the resettlement process.
According to the household respondents, SOGECOA had already set up camp behind the
Mungassa neighborhood before they were visited by representatives of SOGECOA and the
municipality, including the Mayor. During these first engagements a census was made of the
households deemed eligible for resettlement. The criteria for eligibility was the subject of considerable
contention and based on the permanence of dwellings in Mungassa, based largely on the discretion of
the neighborhood secretary. In this initial phase only around 50 households were identified as eligible
for resettlement who would come to form the first resettlement group.
During negotiations these households were told that they would receive new houses in close
vicinity to their current location. As access to transport and social infrastructure had been their main
concern, many respondents agreed to the terms offered, although they admitted to ‘not having any
choice’. However, a week before their resettlement in 2013 it became apparent that the location had
been changed to the peripheral neighborhood of Ndunda, some 3.5 km from the N6 highway in
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a remote and undeveloped urban expansion area without social infrastructure of public transport.
According to respondents of the municipality and SOGECOA, they had not been able to negotiate the
necessary land titles to the location initially agreed upon with the community.
Faced with substantial protests due to the new location, the municipality sought to appease
various influential households and local leaders by providing them with multiple houses, additional
cash compensation, and motorbikes, leading to widespread suspicion of collusion and unfair treatment
among the resettled population.
The second resettlement group was formed by households which had been left out of the initial
census, on the basis of not owning fully constructed houses in Mungassa at the time. According to the
municipality this group consisted of ‘opportunists’ who sought to illegitimately claim compensation.
According to various respondents from the second group however, they had acquired the land in
Mungassa without knowing of the pending resettlement, often receiving declarations of occupancy
from the neighborhood secretary who had not notified them of the nearing project. With the prospect
of losing their investments without compensation, the group formed a committee with appointed
representatives, lobbying the municipality and engaging in protests. The group soon expanded to
include members from the first group who had refused to relocate to the peripheral area of Ndunda,
totaling around 60 households. After such protests were televised on a national news network,
the municipality eventually agreed to provide the group with building materials and titled plots in the
urban expansion area Mangalene; which is in closer vicinity to social infrastructure then Ndunda but
without water or electricity infrastructure.
The third group consisted of the two households which had owned properties with formal titles
through the national housing scheme. Both owners had rejected the resettlement terms offered by the
project representatives and had taken their complaints to the provincial government, which according
to the Mozambican law is required to oversee all resettlements. In doing so, these households displaced
significantly more institutional awareness and access than the other community members. As a result,
both households were eventually allocated new residential properties in two different locations of
considerably higher quality than those of the other two groups. One house was located adjacent to the
resettlement location of group two, while the other was located next to the resettlement location of the
urban drainage rehabilitation project discussed later.
5.1.3. The New Urban Spaces of the SEZ Investment
During the final field visits in 2017 the Manga Mungassa SEZ had begun to rise on the cleared
land of the resettled households. Billboards depicting artificial lakes, yacht clubs, and waterfront villas
served to inform inquisitive passerby of the constructions underway and that that this was no ordinary
manufacturing zone, but a space of worldly luxury far removed from the urban reality of Beira city.
For those inquisitive outsiders not content with billboards alone however, towering walls around
the SEZ assured that the development inside would remain a mystery to them. Therefore, for the
uninitiated majority, the SEZ project constituted something of an urban ‘black box’.
Aside from the SEZ we that the intervention lead to the creation of additional urban spaces
to house the three resettlement groups which were forged out of the SEZ’s micropolitics. For the
members of group one, their new space constituted several rows of poorly constructed concrete
houses in a peripheral region, some 3.5 km by foot from public transport in an area of seasonal
inundation. Without any social infrastructure in the area families soon found themselves severely
restricted in household mobility, with widespread vulnerability and a reduction in overall wellbeing
as a consequence. Although the houses had water and electricity connections, many had since been
cut of as a result of towering bills. The new neighborhood was also surrounded by a poorly planned
drainage network which contained dormant water for large parts of the year, leading to high incidences
of waterborne diseases in the community. Some three years after the resettlement, the households
had still not received land titles, an issue which many appeared profoundly aware of through the
experience of resettlement, further perpetuating a sense of insecurity.
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The families of the second resettlement group found themselves in the new urban space of
Mangalene, which was substantially closer to the public transport access of the N6 then Ndunda but
without water and electricity infrastructure. As the building materials provided by the municipality
were only to construct single bedroom homes, they were required to invest substantial financial
resources into additional material and hired labor. This investment threshold meant that many of
the plots had not been developed some two years after the resettlement. In contrast to the members
of group one in Ndunda however, the residents of group two had in fact received land titles, likely
due to the sustained lobbying of the neighborhood commission representing them. As titled land
is in high demand among more affluent residents in Beira, the asset value of these households was
considerable higher than that of group one, as titled land can easily fetch 10 times that of untitled
land. Consequentially, many plots had been sold off allowing families to relocate elsewhere with the
earnings of their titled land.
For the vast majority of respondents, the resettlement experience had left traces of deep resentment
and distrust towards the municipality, who was clearly distinguished from SOGECOA as being the
responsible party. One respondent argued that the intervention would serve as an example for future
resettlement stating “future resettlements will be very difficult because people will have learned from
the experience in Mungassa”. Various respondents of group one and two had also heard of other
resettlements, such as the World Bank drainage project (discussed later), which they saw as successful
resettlements. The minimal or absent role of the municipality in these other resettlements was seen as
evidence that it should be left out of future resettlements. The awareness among these respondents of
inconsistent resettlement standards being adopted between various projects served to strengthen the
sense of arbitrariness and injustice which they experienced. Although they had eventually received
considerably better resettlement terms, the two households of group three were similarly resentful
towards the municipality. As a whole, the resettlement had clearly served to diminish any social
legitimacy which the municipality had enjoyed among the resettled households of Mungassa.
5.2. The Chiveve River Rehabilitation Project
5.2.1. Mobilizing Investments for the Chiveve River Rehabilitation
The Chiveve is a small tidal river of 3.5 km running through downtown Beira that had been closed
off in the 1980s. Due to its closure, and years of degradation, the river had become a source of flooding
and pollution. As a result, Beira’s leadership had been actively seeking donor finance to rehabilitate the
river, eventually finding a willing party in the German development bank KFW and the World Bank.
Project planning published in 2013 revealed that the Chiveve intervention would consist of two phases
constituting distinct projects. The first encompassed the rehabilitation and expansion of the rivers
drainage capacity together with the construction of a tidal inlet funded by KFW, while the second
encompassed the development of a 20 hectare urban green space with commercial and recreational
facilities along the banks of the river. The first phase was financed by the KFW while the second was
funded by the KFW and World Bank, both phases totaling circa 31 million USD. As the second phase
was not yet underway at the time of the research, we restrict our discussion to the first phase
The rehabilitation phase was associated with several institutional actors during the planning and
implementation of the Chiveve project, in addition the KFW and World Bank. AIAS, Mozambique’s
national sanitation asset holding company, constituted the project owner and formal recipient of
project funding. The project design and management was contracted to the German engineering firms
CES and Inros Lackner, while construction contracts were awarded to the China Henan International
Cooperation Group (CHICO). As the project also required the eviction of households living in the
project site, it was agreed between AIAS and the municipality that the latter would take responsibility
for resettling the families in question. This constituted an ‘informal’ agreement as Mozambican law
stipulates that resettlements must be coordinated by provincial (central) government departments.
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During the project implementation an additional resettlement consultant was commissioned to oversee
the resettlement on behalf of the municipality.
5.2.2. Clearing Space for the Chiveve River Rehabilitation
The Chiveve rehabilitation required the resettlement of 34 households and an informal market
in late 2011 (although the latter component fell outside the scope of this research). Known as the
community of Mangal, the household were characterized by extreme poverty and precarity, residing
near the (former) mouth of the Chiveve river. The majority of the respondents stated living there for
less than ten years, with some having bought the land and others having simply cleared mangroves
on land without pre-existing ‘informal’ claims. Respondents stated that Mangal was among the
only locations accessible to them due to land prices in Beira. None of the respondents had formal
titles to their properties. Despite being a hazardous area, the downtown location of Mangal was
of crucial importance to the families living there, as many could access social infrastructure and
income-generating activities without having to pay for public transport.
Both the KFW and World Bank have formally adopted the World Bank social safeguards in
relation to project finance to government recipients. Despite this however, the resettlement was neither
reflective of these standards nor of the Mozambican resettlement law, as considerable ambiguity had
been cast around the accountability and ‘ownership’ of the resettlement. This was due to the fact that
the municipality had allegedly planned to resettle the Mangal community prior to the involvement
of the KFW and World Bank. In project documents of both banks, conflicting accounts were given
of the relationship between the rehabilitation project and the resettlement. While a KFW impact
assessment spoke of having ‘integrated’ the resettlement into the project due to a ‘certain link with
the project implementation’, World Bank documentation stated that the rehabilitation project had not
required resettlement at all, suggesting it was a parallel yet unrelated initiative undertaken by the
municipality. No project funding was provided for the resettlement by the donors, meaning that the
available resources were extremely limited.
The ambiguity cast in formal documentation as to the relationship between the resettlement and
the river rehabilitation project was strongly contrasted by the reality on the ground. Far from having
a ‘certain link’, or being entirely separate altogether, the resettlement was in fact implemented as
a precondition for the completion of the river rehabilitation works. Moreover, the various project
stakeholders of the rehabilitation project had been heavily involved in negotiating the resettlement
strategy, which led to multiple revisions of the resettlement plan. Due to the fact that each of these
plans were successively communicated to the communities and then withdrawn, the process was
associated with a great deal of confusion and insecurity among the households as to their fate.
The first strategy, which was briefly detailed in KFW’s impact assessment, encompassed the
provision of titles plots and building materials in Ndunda (the location of the first SEZ resettlement
group); a strategy which is not in accordance with the national resettlement framework which requires
the provision of prebuilt houses. This plan was eventually rejected by the KFW and other project
stakeholders on the grounds of not meeting social standards, leading to the formulation of a revised
strategy encompassing the provision of prebuilt houses. This option was greatly preferred by the
Mangal community. However, it soon became apparent that the municipality did not have the
necessary resources for the timely provision of such housing. Faced with mounting complications and
the prospect of delayed rehabilitation works, an independent resettlement consultant was hired by the
municipality and a third and final strategy was developed
The final strategy entailed that the municipality would acquire houses from Beira’s housing
market, while temporarily relocating the households to rental accommodations throughout the city
while the permanent houses were being acquired. The families were informed of this new plan circa
ten days before their eviction, along with the demand that they find the rental accommodations
themselves with a budget provided by the municipality. The community was eventually evicted at
the end of 2014, with the majority of families going on to reside in their rental accommodations for
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six to twelve months before being relocated to their permanent houses acquired by the municipality.
These properties consisted of houses in unplanned ‘informal’ neighborhoods located throughout the
city, several kilometers (at least) form the Mangal area. All in all the resettlement was estimated to
have cost 10,000 US dollars per household at the time.
As a whole, the resettlement process was unregulated, tellingly referred to by a key respondent
as an ‘informal resettlement’. For instance monitoring and coordination were undertaken by the
municipality independently of the provincial (thus central) government departments legally mandated
to so. Political factionism between the central and municipal governments surfaced as a major reason
for the municipality to the provincial government and thus the national resettlement law. Similarly,
no formal resettlement planning or systematic livelihood rehabilitation was undertaken, as required
by both Mozambican law and World Bank standards.
5.2.3. The New Urban Spaces of the Chiveve River Rehabilitation
The first phase of the Chiveve intervention was completed in the beginning of 2017 with the public
inauguration of the rehabilitated Chiveve river. During the televised inauguration representatives
of the central government and municipality became embroiled in a conflict as each sought to take
credit for the project, displaying the political significance and underlying factionism of this high profile
project. The event revealed a river whose retention capacity had been massively increased ending
in a newly constructed ‘lagoon’ connected to the sea through a tidal gate allowing for controlled
water levels. As argued by a key respondent, the Chiveve project was therefore more a feat of heavy
engineering than one of ‘rehabilitation’. Nonetheless, the city’s flood resilience had been greatly
increased, soon to be followed up by the development of a 20 hectare city park in the second phase of
the Chiveve intervention.
For the former households of Mangal community however, whose homes had made way for
the Chiveve lagoon, the Chiveve project had substantially exacerbated their initial poverty and
vulnerability. As the project had not been associated with any structured livelihood rehabilitation,
aside from incidental temporary work on the Chiveve site, the families found themselves having to
adapt twice to the new surroundings of their successive rental and permanent accommodation, several
kilometers from Mangal. Although many considered their new houses to be an improvement in terms
of housing conditions, various houses suffered from leaking rooves and/or lacked improved sanitation.
Although these houses did not constitute new urban spaces in a physical sense, as they had existed
prior to the Chiveve intervention, they were subjected to a set of novel institutional arrangements
which suggested that new spaces of governance had been created. During the resettlement negotiations
it had been decided that the households were to receive formal land titles to their properties. What is
novel in this regard is the fact that urban land titles can only be provided in planned areas according to
Mozambican law. As the resettlement houses were located in unplanned ‘informal’ areas, the land titles
provided were therefore of questionable legal standing, essentially constituting a form of ‘informal’
titling. This suggests that the resettlement process had served to restructure citizen–municipality
relations in a manner neither reflective of established land governance practices nor of formal land
governance as it is defined in laws and regulations.
5.3. The Urban Drainage Rehabilitation Project
5.3.1. Mobilizing Investments for the Urban Drainage Rehabilitation
As one Africa’s most climate vulnerable countries, Mozambique was identified as a target country
of the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), a program financed by the Climate Investment
Fund’s (CIF) under management of the World Bank. In 2010, during negotiations between the
World Bank and Mozambican government over PPCR investment locations, it became apparent
that the World Bank and other bilateral donors saw Beira city as an ideal candidate. However, as
observed by Shankland & Cambote [25], factionist interests led the central government to initially resist
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Beira’s candidacy. After vigorous lobbying by donors however, Beira was chosen as an investment
PPCR location.
It was determined that the finance would go towards the rehabilitation and expansion of Beira’s
storm water drainage system which dated form the colonial era. The project encompassed the widening
and rehabilitation of 9.3 km of urban drainage infrastructure dating from the colonial era, as well as the
construction of a retention basin. The project, estimated at around 45 million USD, constituted the first
of a three phase overhaul of the city’s drainage infrastructure outlined in a drainage master plan which
was developed by the Portuguese engineering firm TPF Planege as part of the PPCR initiative. As with
the Chiveve case, AIAS constituted the formal recipient of the funds, with construction contracts being
similarly awarded to the China Henan International Cooperation Group (CHICO). As the project also
entailed resettlement, the same resettlement consultant of the Chiveve case was contracted to oversee
the community engagement.
5.3.2. Clearing Space for the Urban Drainage Rehabilitation
For 21 households living along Beira’s drainage channels, the urban drainage rehabilitation project
implied the destruction of their homes and resettlement to a new area. The construction of a retention
basin in the in the central floodplain of Maraza, an area historically used for rice cultivation [28],
implied in turn the eviction of 490 small-scale farmers. In contrast to the SEZ and Chiveve case, the
resettlement was coordinated by the necessary provincial government departments and subjected to
formal resettlement planning, as stipulated by Mozambican law. Similarly, in contrast to these previous
cases, was the fact that the project finance included funds earmarked specifically for the resettlement,
amounting to circa 60,000 US dollars per house.
The 21 households lived scattered along the drainage channels throughout several neighborhoods.
The majority of the families were long term occupants for several decades, some of which stated
having acquired property titled through the (former) nationalized housing scheme. Formal notice of
the pending resettlement was given in 2014 by the neighborhood secretary and resettlement consultant.
The vast majority of the respondents reported that the communication of the resettlement had been
well structured and coordinated, encompassing several meetings, in stark contrast to the previous cases.
Respondents stated that the neighborhood of Ndunda (location of first group of the SEZ resettlement)
had initially been identified, but that it was eventually decided against due to the peripheral location
and insufficient social infrastructure. The tranquil area of Mutondo, located next to the floodplain
where the retention basin was to be established, was eventually identified as a suitable location.
The households were eventually relocated to a purpose built residential area in the second half of 2016.
With regards to the 490 farmers, which occupied a total of circa 610 plots, the project plans
stated that they were to receive replacement agricultural land in the neighborhoods of Mungassa
and Inhamizua. It was stated explicitly that World Bank regulations prohibited the provision of
cash compensation alone. Despite this however, cash compensation was in fact what the vast
majority received instead of replacement land, at 5000 meticals per household (65 USD at the time).
Two different accounts emerged as to why the resettlement plans were eventually deviated from—in
direct contradiction of World Bank standards. According to project staff, the affected farmers had
voiced their favor of cash compensation instead of replacement land. According to local leaders
however, the farmers had initially been offered money only, not land. According to the latter account
land had only been provided to several farmers which had asked for it on their own initiative. Due to
these different narratives it was not possible to ascertain the reason why the resettlement plan was
deviated from, in apparent contradiction to World Bank standards.
What was clear however, was the fact that the provision of replacement agricultural land was
in contradiction to the municipality’s own urban development vision, which is premised on the
systematic displacement of agricultural land use from the city. In fact both Mungassa and Inhamizua
constitute areas which have been earmarked for future urban expansion. The provision of replacement
land in these areas would therefore not have constituted a long term solution. The inherent insecurity
Sustainability 2018, 10, 3123 14 of 18
of Beira’s urban farming was not addressed in the resettlement plan, pointing to either a lack of
understanding of Beira’s contemporary land politics, or a lack of commitment to devising sustainable
livelihood rehabilitation for farmers.
5.3.3. The New Urban Spaces of the Urban Drainage Rehabilitation
With the drainage rehabilitation project more than 9 km of degraded and overgrown drainage
infrastructure was transformed into concrete channels, spanning several neighborhoods in Beira.
The circa 25 hectare retention basin in the Maraza stands as a circular urban lake, which is rumored to
become the focus of future real estate developments. Walking along these sleek concrete waterways,
occasionally traversed by roads and walkways, it becomes apparent that this is one the largest public
infrastructure investments which Beira has seen since independence.
As with the previous two cases however, the drainage itself was not the only new urban space
created through this intervention. A purpose-built block of houses now stands in the neighborhood
of Mutondo, home to a newly formed community of families who previously resided throughout
the city. Encompassing several rows of fenced properties, a road, sidewalk, and recreational space it
exudes a degree of uniformity typically found in ‘Northern’ suburbia, far removed from the urbanism
that characterizes Beira. Compared to the houses of the other resettlement cases, excluding the third
group of the SEZ resettlement, the houses and infrastructure were of far superior quality. In further
contrast with the previous cases was the eagerness of the funding donor to be associated with the
resettlement, with multiple billboards carrying the World Bank logo leaving no doubt as to the financer
of this showcased resettlement.
Indeed the vast majority of household respondents were in agreement that the resettlement had
constituted a significant improvement in terms of housing conditions. What was less apparent to those
on the outside looking in however, was the fact that the households had received no assistance in
terms of livelihood rehabilitation. This was determined not to be necessary in the resettlement plan,
in apparent contradiction to national laws and World Bank standards. Thus, behind the walls of these
model homes, widespread accounts emerged of increased vulnerability as families struggled to adapt
to the new location. As stated tellingly by one respondent ‘people are going to sleep hungry, they have
a house, but they are going to sleep hungry’. Increased transport costs and utility bills meant that the
drop in household income was further exacerbated by a rise in living expenses. It was only until a visit
by World Bank staff after the resettlement that the need for ex-post livelihood assistance was identified.
Six months after the resettlement however, during the final research fieldwork, such assistance had
still not materialized.
As with the Chiveve case, this new community also found themselves within novel governance
arrangements which bore no relation to ‘alternative formality’ or formal land governance
regulations [32]. This was due to the fact that it was decided by project staff that the households
would not be permitted to sell their houses, a measure based neither on national law or international
standards. The reasoning behind this measure was that it would protect families from regressing in
terms of living standards through the sale of their properties. As a consequence the resettled families
were effectively frozen in the state of increased vulnerability which the resettlement had placed them
in. However perhaps most problematic is the fact that households respondents did not appear aware
of this measure until after the resettlement.
Although the displacement of the 490 farmers had not resulted in the direct creation of new
spaces, their displacement invariably had social-spatial implications. Farming, like many livelihood
activities in Beira, is strongly gendered and predominantly undertaken by women. Interviews with
respondents which had lost their land revealed that many had taken up additional livelihood activities
to compensate for the loss of farmland. Informal street vending known as negócios, which is a
similarly gendered livelihood activity, emerged as a major replacement livelihood activity. Recent
years have seen the municipality become increasingly hostile towards negócios activities, branding
them as disorderly and dangerous. Thus we see that displacement of farmland feeds into other
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urban dynamics which will likely be the target of future eviction and displacement under the current
municipal modernization strategy.
6. Discussion
As demonstrated in this article, previously neglected African cities are now becoming the recipient
of international investment flows targeting the built environment [4,5]. A general trait of these
divergent flows is that they are often premised on the availability of land, irrespective of the social
utility of the infrastructures they seek to erect. As Africa’s urban land is by definition already occupied,
this surge in infrastructure interventions has come hand in hand with a surge in DID and resettlement.
These dynamics have not been analyzed in detail in the urban context and exhibit some fundamental
differences with DID and resettlement in the rural realm.
DID and resettlements related to investments in the rural context have often been found
to be driven by the central state, together with international financial institutions and private
investors [6,7,35]. In Beira however, we see that the notion of the ‘state’ is a problematic one, as it
encompasses administrative levels governed by political competitors. As a result, the interest of the
central state is arguably not to facilitate investments, but to frustrate them, creating an incentive at the
municipality level to ‘go it alone’ where possible. These political-institutional fissures are by no means
unique to Beira, and have been discussed elsewhere in debates on the politics of decentralized urban
development [36].
The ‘rogue’ nature of these resettlement processes is further exacerbated by a lack of (inter)national
civil society oversight, who generally do not have the resources or incentive to mobilize on behalf
of relatively small DID populations. In cities with a negligible local civil society clout such as Beira,
this effectively translates to a total lack of third party oversight during negotiations. This is likely to
become a more common feature of urban DID and resettlements, as urban interventions generally
occur on a much smaller scale then rural enclosures. Taken together with the contentious institutional
politics, this creates a vacuum wherein multiple seemingly inconspicuous resettlements are negotiated,
in a highly informal manner, bearing little resemblance to national policies, or the ideals of participative
land governance which have informed large-scale rural resettlements (however superficially) [4,6,7].
This is by no means an issue of local institutional ‘capacity’ alone however, as each infrastructure
project is shaped by a different cluster of (international) actors whose vested interests in resettlements
differ greatly. The net outcome is multiple resettlements shaped entirely by the arbitrariness of
project-specific interests.
However if we move away from viewing these resettlements as separate and unrelated, and
see them as an expression of the same urban development regime, we can see that these individual
DID populations are in fact part of an expanding urban DID population. We argue that such a
perspective is more reflective of how urban DID populations see themselves, as close proximity
of these interventions means that DID populations are often acutely aware of other resettlements
nearby, serving as a basis of comparison to their own experiences. What becomes immediately
clear from this perspective is the sheer divergence of the resettlement processes represented among
this population. Moreover, these differences appear to be entirely random, bearing no discernable
relationship to the losses or needs of affected populations. We argue, tentatively, that the multiplicity
and close proximity of these interventions point to a distinctly ‘urban’ mode of resettlement politics,
whereby the resettlement experiences of fellow urbanites provide a basis for articulating resistance
and/or expectations with regards to new interventions. This points to potential cumulative impacts
of (multiple) urban resettlements which extend far beyond the neat confines of ‘project affected
persons’ alone.
These disruptive dynamics disappear entirely if we annex them from our evaluations of new
infrastructures. In fact, by doing so, we could even argue that some of the cases discussed in this article
constitute forms of sustainable infrastructure, due to their public utility and enhancement of climate
resilience. Indeed this is a narrative which has seen much praise come to the leadership of Beira,
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whereby new infrastructures are celebrated as if appearing out of nowhere. While such a selective
focus can perhaps be expected from political leaders, or indeed the many ‘urban fantasies’ planned in
Africa, we argue that it is up to progressive deliberations of sustainable urban development to address
the earlier ‘moment’ of displacement in a proactive manner [3]. This begins by extending the notion of
sustainability to include the impacts of infrastructure development on established land claims. Such
a broad conception of sustainability has long been the norm in rural development debates, which
has resulted in numerous policy and scholarly efforts to reconcile land investments with land related
impacts [4].
From a conceptual perspective we argue that DID and resettlement should not be understood as a
destructive process alone, but a ‘creative’ one as well, whereby new social-spatial arrangements are
forged. As demonstrated in this article, for each ‘primary’ infrastructure investment, we see additional
‘secondary’ spaces being created, taking the form of new structures and/or novel governance relations.
This is particularly relevant to the urban context as these new spaces are integrated into broader
urban dynamics and thus inevitably feed back into them. If we recognize these spaces as deliberate
and fundamental components of ‘development’, as opposed to incidental and marginal, then they
begin to resemble a distinct mode of urbanism which, as seen in Beira, bears little resemblance to
established urban dynamics. As we have argued this is a mode of urbanism which, in its current
guise, is fundamentally at odds with ‘activation of citizens and rights’ which sustainable infrastructure
strives for [3] (p. 15). Consequentially there is an urgent need for this creative process to be brought to
the fore, so that it can be debated on par with infrastructure development in a broader framework of
urban sustainability.
7. Conclusions
With this article we have sought to provide a much needed empirical contribution to the emerging
urban land debate. By looking behind the curtain of three high profile infrastructure interventions in
Beira city, we have made visible the unregulated and contradictory processes of DID and resettlements
upon which they have been premised. We have demonstrated that these land related impacts
bear no discernable relationship to the social utility of the infrastructures in question, appearing a
feature of both exclusionary neoliberal infrastructures (the SEZ) and arguable inclusionary sustainable
infrastructures (public green spaces) in Beira. However, these findings should be understood as
tentative and exploratory. Our intent is not to generalize, and substantial (comparative) empirical
and conceptual work will be required to understand how these dynamics play out in other urban
contexts. This implies a further exploration of the research agenda laid out by Zoomers et al. [4]
which seeks to bridge the isolated ‘containers’ of debates on land governance research and debates on
African urbanism/urban development. In reference to Pieterse et al. [3] we argue that this is not only a
scholarly agenda, but one which requires a close and novel engagement with urban policy and politics.
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